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SOME COMMENTS ON "THE BILL OF
RIGHTS AS A CONSTITUTION"
AKHIL REED AMAR*
Let me try to explain what I mean by the title of my paper,
"The Bill of Rights as a Constitution."l Some years ago, Pro-
fessor Berns wrote a very thoughtful essay called "The Consti-
tution as Bill of Rights,"2 picking up on Alexander Hamilton's
analysis in The Federalist Number 84, in which Hamilton argued
that the Constitution was for every important purpose itself a
Bill of Rights.3 What Hamilton meant was that the structure of
government played a very important role in protecting people
from government tyranny. There are not many "thou shalt
not" provisions in the Constitution;4 the document's main em-
phasis is on more self-consciously structural issues like federal-
ism, separation of powers, bicameralism, representation, and
constitutional amendment.5 Hamilton was arguing that
through devices such as these, liberty would be protected and
government held in check.6 Hamilton also argued in The Feder-
alist Number 84 that the Preamble was profoundly important;7
that most of the important rights of the people were retained
• Professor, Yale Law School.
1. What follows is a lightly edited version of my oral remarks at the 1991 Federalist
Society Symposium, summarizing my article, The Bill ofRights as a Constitution, 100 YALE
LJ. 1131 (1991). The interested reader is encouraged to refer to my more detailed
presentation in that essay.
2. See Walter Berns, The Constitution as Bill ofRights, in How DOES THE CONSTITUTION
SECURE RICHTS? 50 (Robert A. Goldwin & WilIiam A. Schambra eds., 1985).
3. See THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 515 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
4. See, e.g., U.S. CaNST. art. I, § 9 (limiting the powers of Congress); art. I, § 10 (re-
stricting the powers of the States).
5. See, e.g., U.S. CaNST. art. I-III (vesting legislative, executive, and judicial powers in
separate institutions, respectively); art. I, §§ 1-2 (providing for bicameral legislature);
art. V (outlining nonexclusive procedure for constitutional amendment).
6. See THE FEDERALIST No. 84, supra note 3, at 510-11.
7. See id. at 513. •
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simply by the language of the Preamble and the philosophy it
represented: "We the People of the United States ... do ordain
and establish this Constitution ...."8 What he meant is that
here we have a document emanating from a popular sovereign,
and popular sovereignty (or what Professor Graglia would
probably call "democracy" or "majoritarianism")9 is an impor-
tant device for securing liberty-especially the public liberty of
democratic or collective self-governance.
I would like to suggest that if we look carefully at the Bill of
Rights, we will see it as much less discontinuous with the origi-
nal Constitution than most of us have been led to believe. Most
of us tend to embrace the conventional reading that the Bill of
Rights is fundamentally, paradigmatically, not about struc-
ture-that is, not about things like federalism, bicameralism,
representation, and constitutional amendment. Most of us also
think that the Bill of Rights is not about majoritarianism.
Rather, we think the Bill of Rights is self-consciously counter-
majoritarian at its core: We think the Bill of Rights is about
individual rights, not majority rights. I think that is wrong. The
essence of the Bill of Rights and the essence of the Constitu-
tion are profoundly populist, democratic, majoritarian, and
structural.
Now, let me try to defend my rather sweeping claims about
both the original Constitution and the Bill of Rights. First, let
me remind you that those who adopted our Constitution were
Revolutionaries. 1O They saw themselves as Revolutionaries. In
their own era they were radical democrats. It is true that in
Eighteenth Century America there were profound exclusions
from the perspective of 1991-women, slaves, et cetera-but
from the perspective of 1787, the process by which the Consti-
tution became the supreme law of the land was more funda-
mentally participatory and democratic than anything that had
ever preceded it in the history of the planet. Previous societies
had been chartered by individual great men and lawgivers
claiming a pipeline to God, such as Moses, Solon, and Lycur-
gus. Even in the American experience, the predecessor to the
8. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
9. See Lino Graglia, How Should Courts Interpret the Bill ofRights?, 15 HARV.J.L. & PUB.
POL'y 149, 151-52 (1992).
10. But see CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION
(1913) (arguing that anti-democratic economic interests, and in particular wealthy
property owners, were behind ratification of the Constitution).
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Constitution, the Articles of Confederation, was never adopted
by the peoples of the States. 11 Nor were the state constitutions
popularly ratified, except for those of New Hampshire and
Massachusetts in 1784 and 1780, respectively.12 So the pre-ex-
isting state constitutions had not direcdy involved the people
and neither had the Articles of Confederation-but the Consti-
tution did. Look at the most important-the constitutive-part
of the original Constitution, Article VII, which says that by a
simple majority vote of a specially convened convention, the
people of Virginia could make the Constitution their supreme
law. IS Whether you look at the Preamble, with its language
"We the People of the United States," which sounds so popu-
list, or Article VII, the last article of the original Constitution,
the essence of the document, I would argue, is fundamentally
participatory, democratic, and majoritarian at the most impor-
tant level.
What level is that? It is the level of who gets to make the
Constitution and therefore who can "un-make" it. Ordinary
day-to-day governance, of course, is more detached from the
people-indirect election of Senators, a filtered presidency, a
judiciary that is ever more insulated-but with regard to the
process ofConstitutional creation, Article VII is extraordinarily
m<tioritarian and democratic. As I have argued at previous Fed-
eralist Society meetings, the process of constitutional amend-
ment is likewise majoritarian.14 I do not believe that Article V is
the exclusive mechanism by which the Constitution can be
amended.15 The people retain-and here I am using the phrase
"the people" to mean the collective popular sovereign-an un-
alterable, inalienable, and indefeasible right to alter and abol-
ish their government by simple majority vote in specially
convened conventions. That is how the Constitution was
adopted in the 1780s, state constitutions notwithstanding, and
that is how it can be amended.
What I want to argue here is that the Bill of Rights is consis-
tent with that vision. The phrase "the people" appears twice in
11. See EDMUND S. MORGAN, THE BIRTH OF THE REPUBLIC 1763-89, at 100-11 (1977).
12. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at
306-43 (1969).
13. See U.S. CONST. art. VII.
14. See generally Akhil Reed Amar, Philadelphia Reuisited: Amending the Constitution
Outside Article V, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1043 (1988) (elaborating the ideas summarized in
this paragraph).
15. See U.S. CONST. art. V.
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the original Constitution-in the Preamble and in Article I's
reference to "the people" voting for Congress. There is no
phrase that appears more often in the Bill of Rights than the
phrase "the people." Here, too, the phrase had a core meaning
of the people collectively. In its core, in its essence, the phrase is
about popular sovereignty. It is there in the First Amendment,
the right of the people to assemble and petition. 16 It is there in
the Second, the right of the people to keep and bear arms}7 It
is there in the Fourth,18 the Ninth,19 and the Tenth Amend-
ments.20 In virtually every case, we can understand it as an echo
of the popular sovereignty motif of the original Constitution.
I. A BIRD'S EVE VIEW OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS
Let me briefly try to offer some readings of the various
clauses of the Bill of Rights-readings rather different from
what you have probably heard in law school. Each one of these
readings may sound a little odd to you, and when you put them
together they will sound very odd to you, but their overall con-
sistency and harmony suggest that the original Bill of Rights
was rather different from the way we have imagined it. Before I
do that, however, let me say one final thing. We may today have
the Bill of Rights that is appropriate and that we deserve, but it
is a very different one from the one that was created 200 years
ago. I would suggest that if that is so, if the transformation of
the Bill of Rights has been legitimate on interpretivist grounds,
for those who take seriously the document as a whole, it is only
because the Bill of Rights was profoundly changed when it was
incorporated against the States via the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. So the debate really will turn on whether the Fourteenth
Amendment is appropriately read to incorporate the Bill of
16. See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law ... abridging •.. the
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress
of grievances.") (emphasis added).
17. See U.S. CONST. amend. II ("[T]he right of the people to keep and bear Arms ..•
shall not be infringed.") (emphasis added).
18. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons.
houses. papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated ... ,") (emphasis added).
19. See U.S. CONST. amend. IX ("The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.") (em-
phasis added).
20. See U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respec-
tively, or to the people,") (emphasis added).
HeinOnline -- 15 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 103 1992
No.1] Bills of Rights As A Constitution 103
Rights against the States. If the case for incorporation can be
made,21 then the essence of the Bill of Rights becomes very
different because Reconstruction was about protecting minori-
ties and counter-majoritarian rights in a way that the original
Bill of Rights, I argue, was not.
There were twelve original amendments that were proposed
by the first Congress.22 Only the last ten were ratified. So the
thing that we call the "First Amendment" was not the first
amendment. The original "First Amendment" actually had to
do with government size. It said Congress needed to be bigger;
there had to be a secure minimum size of Congress going be-
yond what Article I provided.23 It was, in its essence, a struc-
tural provision about representation, reflecting the idea that
liberty will best be protected if government is more representa-
tive of the people. With a small Congress, only a few. great elite
men would get into office and they would not have a sense of
fellow feeling and sympathy with ordinary constituents. So by
expanding Congress's size, the original "First Amendment"
was designed to tighten the link between Congress and its con-
stituents. That is a majoritarian kind ofamendment, an amend-
ment about structure and representation. The original "Second
Amendment" prohibited Congress from voting itself a pay in-
crease until there had been an intervening election.24 Once
again, we see here concerns about the structure of government,
about government self-dealing, and about the possibility of an
21. There is considerable debate on this issue, into which I have entered elsewhere.
See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill ofRights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE LJ.
(forthcoming 1992). Compare Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46,74-75 (1947) (Black,].,
dissenting) (maintaining that "no state could deprive its citizens of the privileges and
protections of the Bill of Rights") with 332 U.S. at 59-68 (Frankfurter, ]., concurring)
(critiquing]ustice Black's view) and William]. Brennan, The Bill ofRights and the States,
36 N.Y.U. L. REV. 761 (1964) (promoting compromise of "selective incorporation").
22. See 1 Stat. 97-98 (1789).
23. The original text read:
Mter the first enumeration required by the first article of the Constitution,
there shall be one Representative for every thirty thousand, until the number
shall amount to one hundred, after which the proportion shall be so regulated
by Congress, that there shall be not less than one hundred Representatives,
nor less than one Representative for every forty thousand persons, until the
number of Representatives shall amount to two hundred; after which the pro-
portion shall be so regulated by Congress, that there shall not be less than two
hundred Representatives, nor more than one Representative for every fifty
thousand persons.
[d. at 97.
24. The original text read: "No law varying the compensation for the services of the
Senators and Representatives shall take effect, until an election ofRepresentatives shall
have intervened." 1 Stat. 97 (1789).
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unrepresentative government. This was a majoritarian provi-
sion, too.
Here is another way of putting the point. Recall The Federalist
Number 51.25 Madison says there are two basic issues in govern-
ment. One is protecting citizens generally against an unrepre-
sentative government.26 In a corporation, if a board of
directors and a management team are established, they may try
to run the corporation in their own interest and not in the in-
terest of the shareholders. That is the first problem with gov-
ernment-making sure that government officials are not doing
things solely for their own benefit. The second issue, Madison
says, is protecting a minority from a majority of fellow citi-
zens,27 like protecting a minority ofshareholders from a major-
ity of shareholders. The original Bill of Rights was much more
about the first issue-what economists would call the "agency"
problem of government-than it was about the second issue. It
was much more about protecting majorities of citizens from
possibly unrepresentative, elitist, and self-interested govern-
ment. We see that in the original "First Amendment," which
came within one state of being adopted.28 The original "Sec-
ond Amendment" was also dearly about government self-
dealing.
Now, consider our First Amendment, which today is often
understood as protecting individual autonomy, self-expression,
and personhood. These are important themes-I do not want
to suggest that they are not-but they are not all of the First
Amendment. Rather, as Alexander Meiklejohn has argued,29
the core of the First Amendment is about representative gov-
ernment and the need for constituents to be able to participate
in that representative process by voicing their views. It is also
about protecting a majority of people from a possibly unrepre-
sentative government. Un?er the original (un-Reconstructed)
25. See THE FEDERAUST No. 51 (James Madison).
26. See id. at 323 (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
27. See id. at 323-25.
28. Only Delaware voted against it. Delaware favored a smaller Congress, because in
a smaller Congress it would receive a larger share of the vote. Ten of the states ratified
this amendment; one did not. This is the only difference between the original "First
Amendment" and the last ten, which were ratified by eleven states and are now in the
Constitution. See 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 321-76 (Washington, Department of State, 1894).
29. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POunCAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS
OF THE PEOPLE (1960).
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vision, the paradigmatic First Amendment rights-holders are
not Jehovah's Witnesses or Communists or unpopular speak-
ers; they are the Republican Party of 1800 that actually repre-
sented a majority of the citizens, but whose speech was being
suppressed by an unrepresentative Congress. That is why, for
example, these Republicans were trying to argue to a jury that
the Alien and Sedition Acts were unconstitutional.so A jury is a
more populist body. Ajury will protect popular speech criticiz-
ing government, and that is why there is a strong linkage be-
tween free speech and jury trial in the Eighteenth Century.Sl
Today, because we think the First Amendment is counter-
majoritarian, we distrust juries and we try to get issues to
judges rather than juries. Note one final thing about the Sedi-
tion Act. Here we see government trying to keep itself in office.
It is a crime for a challenger to criticize an incumbent Con-
gressman, but it is not a crime for the incumbent Congressman
to criticize his challenger. The Act illustrates the problem of
government officials entrenching themselves in office, the
agency problem, the self-dealing problem of government.
The original right of "the people" to "assemble" is about
the right of the people to -assemble in conventions to alter and
abolish their government. The Second Amendment is in large
part about protecting the right of revolution against an unrep-
resentative government, and in particular one trying to use a
federal standing army to suppress a majority of citizens and re-
press democracy. So, too, with the Third Amendment. It is not
so much about privacy; it is about controlling a federal govern-
ment that is going to have an army and therefore be able to
repress a m-uority of citizens. The Fourth Amendment is in
large part about making sure that people whose houses are
searched by an unrepresentative government can get to a pop-
ular jury. The key clause of the Fourth Amendment is that gov-
30. See JAMES M. SMrnI, FREEDOM'S FETrERS: THE AUEN AND SEDmON LAws AND
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES 159-417 (1956).
31. Recall John Peter Zenger and the Alien and Sedition LaWS. Zenger, who pub-
lished a newspaper entitled the New York Weekly Journal in which the policies of the
royal government were criticized, was charged with seditious libel and brought to trial
in 1734-35. His acquittal by a New York jury was a landmark decision in helping to
establish freedom of the press in America. SeeJAMES ALEXANDER, A BRIEF NARRATIVE OF
THE CASE AND TRIAL OF JOHN PETER ZENGER (1989). Likewise, the controversy sur-
rounding the Alien and Sedition Laws focused attention on the linkage between jury
trial and the press. See 1 Stat. 577-78, 596-97 (1798); SMrnI, supra note 30, at 418-33.
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ernment searches and seizures must be reasonable.32 Today
judges may arrogate Fourth Amendment issues to themselves,
but 200 years ago reasonableness was a question for the jury to
decide. Once again the idea was that local and populist institu-
tions like juries would keep an unrepresentative government in
check.
In the Fifth Amendment, the Takings Clause33 seems a little
bit more of an individual rights provision than the rest. Yet
even here, the Clause applies only against the federal govern-
ment and not the States. The federal government is the gov-
ernment that actually is going to be less representative, but as
The Federalist Number 10 tells us, there is not going to be a ma-
jority tyranny problem in the federal government the way there
will be with the States.34 So the fact that the Takings Clause-
like the rest of the Bill of Rights-applies only against the fed-
eral government suggests that its core concern is not abusive
majoritarianism but unrepresentative government. What about
the rest of the Fifth Amendment? Due process means, in its
core, presentment by good and lawful men, that is, a populist
grand jury that is rooted in the right of the people to partici-
pate in government. Double jeopardy is about protecting the
integrity of an original jury verdict against being overturned.
The jury is featured in three separate amendments: in the
Fifth (grand jury),35 in the Sixth (criminal jury),36 and in the
Seventh (civiljury).37 Thejury is not just about litigants' rights;
it is about the people's rights to be on the jury and to partici-
pate in government. This vision sees the jury as a democratic
public school, educating citizens in their rights and duties. It
connects to Judge Easterbrook's point about how the Constitu-
tion, to make a difference, has to be the lived experience of
32. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people ... against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated ....").
33. See U.S. CONST. ameI!d. V ("[N]or shall private property be taken for public usc,
without just compensation.").
34. See THE FEDERAUST No. 10, at 82-84 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
35. See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or
othe~ise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury
.... ).
36. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury •...").
37. See U.S. CONST. amend. VII ("In suits at common law ... the right of trial byjury
shall be preserved ....n).
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citizens and be integrated into the culture.s8 Part of the way to
do that is to have jury service.
Juries are also about judicial bicameralism. There is a more
elitist upper house (thejudge) and a more populist lower house
(the jury). Two hundred years ago, juries were often judges of
both law and fact. If you thought a statute was unconstitutional
and you were being prosecuted under it, as with the Alien and
Sedition Acts, you would want to make your argument not just
to the judge, but to ajury also. Perhaps you could not convince
the judge because the judge had been appointed by the very
President whom you were trying to criticize, so you tried to
make your argument to the jury by saying: 'jury, this law is
unconstitutional. Under the Supremacy Clauses9 it is no law at
all. Therefore, by your own oaths of office to the law, you can-
not convict me."
In the Fourth Amendment context, when a government offi-
cial breaks into your house without good reason, you sue that
person, and you argue before ajury. It is a civil jury-a Seventh
Amendment jury rather than a Sixth Amendment jury-but
again, it is ajury that is keeping an eye on governmental uncon-
stitutionality. Why do we have the Eighth Amendment, prohib-
iting cruel and unusual punishment and excessive bail? It is in
part because in sentencing and setting bail, judges often are
acting without juries and therefore are less trustworthy because
judges are permanent government officials. Likewise, men in
the standing army are permanent government officials and less
trustworthy, so you want a populist, localist militia to check a
nationalist, elitist standing army. The populist and localist ju-
rors can similarly check an elitist, more central, and more na-
tionalized set of federal judges.
Finally, consider the Ninth and Tenth Amendments.4o The
Tenth is clearly about federalism in part, but when the Framers
talk about the rights of "the people," in both Amendments,
they are paradigmatically not talking about things like individ-
ual privacy. That was John Stuart Mill, circa 1859.41 That was
38. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Bills ofRights and Regression to the Mean, 15 HARv.J.L. &
PUB. POL'y 71, 72-73 (1992).
39. See U.S. CONST. art. VI ("This Constitution ... shall be the supreme Law of the
Land ..•.").
40. See U.S. CONST. amend. IX; amend. X.
41. SeeJoHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 187-88 (David Spitz ed., W.W. Norton & Co.
1975) (1859).
HeinOnline -- 15 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 108 1992
108 HarvardJournal ofLaw & Public Policy [Vol. 15
the Fourteenth Amendment, circa 1868. In 1789, the Framers
were talking about collective rights paradigmatically, like the
right of the people to alter and abolish their government
through devices like conventions.
That completes my bird's-eye view of the "Bill of Rights as a
Constitution." There is ofcourse much more that could be said
about each of the clauses that I have invoked; but I hope that
we now have spotted enough issues to spark lively and profita-
ble debate on the subject.
II. A RESPONSE TO FELLOW PANELISTS
Before I conclude, let me offer a few brief comments on my
fellow panelists' thoughtful reactions to my bird's eye view of
the Bill ofRights. Professor Berns very usefully points us to the
secession experience in which by simple majorities of specially
convened conventions, the people of South Carolina, of Vir-
ginia, et cetera, claimed this right to alter and abolish their ex-
isting government.42 My own view is that they got popular
sovereignty theory right in thinking that it implied a right of
conventions acting by simple majority rule to alter even the
most fundamental ground rules of society. But-and this is of
course a huge "but"-secessionists got the issue of nation ver-
sus state wrong. I am with Abraham Lincoln in thinking that in
the original Constitution, "We the People of the United States
...." meant the people of the United States as a whole.43 The
original Constitution was very different from the Articles of
Confederation which were predicated on the sovereignty of the
people of each state.
I am in the somewhat awkward position of really saying two
things. First, that I believe in national popular majoritarianism
and popular sovereignty. Second, that the Bill of Rights was
promoted by a lot of states' rightist Anti-Federalists; but the
Anti-Federalists are using the word "people" that was there in
the original Constitution, and in the Preamble. They did not
say "peoples" in the Tenth Amendment. They said "people."
42. See Walter Berns, On Madison and Majoritarianism: A Response to Professor Amar, 15
IiARv.].L. & PUB. POL'y 113, 116 (1992); see also RALPH A. WOOSTER, THE SECESSION
CONVENTIONS OF THE SOUTH (1962) (giving a Ihorough history of the conventions spe-
cially convenp.d to consider secession).
43. See Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE LJ. 1425, 1451-66
(1987) (explaining the differences in interpretation between states' rightists and na-
tionalists about Ihe sovereignty of "the People"); Amar, supra note 14, at 1062 n. 69.
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They talked about "the states"-plural-respectively, but they
did not say the "peoples" respectively. As a textualist, I think
that matters. There are other reasons for thinking Lincoln was
right,44 but whatever you think about secession, the theme of
majoritarian popular sovereignty continues to exist at the state
constitutional level with state constitutions being amended by
simple popular majorities of specially convened conventions
throughout the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries.45
I would also like to respond to Professor Berns' invocation of
Madison.46 Professor Berns is absolutely right that Madison's
vision was different from the Bill of Rights as it was adopted.
Madison wanted the original Bill of Rights to apply against the
States precisely because he, as the author of The Federalist
Number 10, thought that the States were a big part of the prob-
lem.47 He lost on that. Madison was less of a majoritarian than
many of the other important folks. James Wilson, for example,
was much more of a populist and m<tioritarian than Madison.
Let me also introduce another minor caveat: Instead of looking
at Madison at the Philadelphia convention-not a great
majoritarian, not a big believer in states' rights-if we instead
look at what Madison became in the Alien and Sedition Act
controversy, we see a defender of a certain kind of federalism
(championing the ability of state legislatures to challenge the
federal government) and of national majoritarianism. A basi-
cally national electorate adjudicates the constitutionality of the
Alien and Sedition Acts in the election of 1800. Even before
that we start to see Madison taking states' rights a little bit
more seriously than he did in Philadelphia by opposing the
constitutionality of the First Bank, for example. Madison is an
interesting case study, and I am grateful to Professor Berns for
reminding us of Madison's thoughts.
Professor Stith made two points that I would like to ad-
dress.48 First, I agree that it is an over-simplification to say that
the only rights in the Bill of Rights are majoritarian or collec-
44. See Amar, OfSovereignty and Federalism, supra note 43, at 1451-66 (cataloguing ar-
guments for union based on text, history, and structure); Akhi1 Reed Amar, Some New
World Lessons for the Old World, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 483, 485-91 (1991) (explaining geo-
strategic arguments for union).
45. See generally ROGER SHERMAN HOAR, CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS (1917).
46. See Berns, supra note 42, at 114-16.
47. See THE FEDERAUST No. 10, supra note 34, at 133-36.
48. See Kate Stith, The Role ofGovemment Under the Bill ofRights, 15 HARV.].L. & PuB.
POL'y 129 (1992).
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tive. I do want, however, to remind us of a tradition that a con-
ventional account has basically made all but invisible. The
Petition Glause49 is a good example. Individuals can petition,
and ofcourse, sometimes petitions will present conflicting indi-
vidual interests. But often we miss the important role of peti-
tions when a majority of citizens complain about
unrepresentative or self-interested government. For example,
in 1816, Congress for the first time since 1789 voted itselfa pay
increase, and there were a lot of populist petitions against
that.50
I would also like to comment on the word "people" in the
Fourth Amendment. Professor Stith is absolutely right that
Tony Amsterdam takes this phrase and tries to make argu-
ments about the exclusionary rule and collective rights.51 I
want to disassociate myself from that in two ways. One, I do
not think in the Fourth Amendment that "the people" is as
strong a phrase as elsewhere, precisely because in this Amend-
ment, but not elsewhere, the phrase is twice modified by the
word "persons," which is much more individualistic. Two, I am
not a supporter of the exclusionary rule. The reason is illustra-
tive of my main theme. Judges have taken the Fourth Amend-
ment and made it the province of judges to enforce in an
exclusionary rule context focusing on criminals. The old way
the Fourth Amendment was litigated, however, was very differ-
ent: The government official broke into your house; you sued
the official in trespass for damages; and a jury rather than a
judge decided.52 Do you know why we do not do that today?
Judges have created a thing called good faith immunity. It has
been created not just as an exception to the exclusionary rule,
but also as an exception to damage actions: When government
officials are acting unconstitutionally, they are now personally
immune from damages in a way that they never were at com-
mon law, and never were even at the beginning of this cen-
tury.53 This is an interesting story about the shift away from
49. See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law ... abridging ..• the
right of the people ... to petition the Government for a redress of grievances,").
50. See 4 ]OHN BACH McMASTER, A HISTORY OF THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES
357-62 (1927).
51. Stith, supra note 48, at 132.
52. ] ustice Scalia has recently re-focused attention on this older model. See Califor-
nia v. Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. 1982, 1992-94 (1991) (Scalia,]., concurring in judgment).
53. See Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, supra note 43, at 1437.
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juries as protectors of the values of the Bill of Rights, and to-
wards judges.
One final word on Professor Langbein's presentation.54 Note
how we have shifted ever so subtly away from a perspective on
jury trial as about popular participation and democratic self-
governance ("We have juries because these are people's repre-
sentatives in the judiciary, just like the people's representatives
in the legislature, and the jury serves their interests and their
rights") to a more defendant-oriented perspective ("It is unfair
for the defendant to get hammered in these plea-bargains"). I
think this attitude is reflected, interestingly, in one key move
that Professor Langbein makes. He says, "You know, the text
of Article III says"-and I agree with him-"...the trial of all
crimes shall be by jury.. ." But then he actually introduces a
little word; he says, "Oh, that means serious crimes." I am not so
sure that it means serious crimes. It may have meant serious
crimes in England or in states that had differently worded con-
stitutions, but there is a nice piece in the Chicago Law Review
that critiques the idea that there is even a petty crime exception
to federaljury tria1.55 Why did Professor Langbein suggest that
there was such an implied exception after emphasizing the
plain meaning of the 'text? Well, if one adopts more of an indi-
vidual rights or defendant-oriented perspective on jury trials,
one is likely to focus on whether the offense charged is a seri-
ous offense. If so, the defendant has more to lose, and so there
is more of an interest in jury trial than where there is a petty
offense. But if you focus instead on the jury as a vehicle for
democratic participation, then the jury has equal value even in
petty offenses. I do not want to push the point too hard. I sus-
pect Professor Langbein might say: "Yes, but at some point the
defendant's interest is key here because there is no similar
mandate on the civil side. So where you do not have an individ-
ual defendant subject to the extraordinary coercive power of
government-where you have individual versus individual, as
in Professor Stith's petition case-jury trial may be waived by
the parties in a way that was not true in the criminal context."
That reminds us of Professor Stith's big point: There are indi-
54. John H. Langbein, On the Myth ofWritten Constitutions: The Disappearance ofCriminal
Jury Trial, 15 HARV.J.L. & PUB. POL'y 119 (199~).
55. See George Kaye, Petty Offenders Have No Peers, 26 U. CHI. L. REV. 245 (1959)
(criticizing Felix Frankfurter and Thomas G. Corcoran, Petty Federal Offenses and the Con-
stitutional Guaranty of Trial ByJury, 39 HARV. L. REV. 917 (1926».
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vidual rights aspects to these issues as well. I merely want to
caution us against thinking that this is all that is at issue. There
are other concerns, and we have forgotten many of them.
